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Joseph LaPosta joined the police force hoping to gain more experience
within the Borough of Roseland Police Department, for which he had been
working as a dispatcher.' He completed the necessary training at the police
academy and received his assignment as a police officer.2 Upon his
assignment, Officer LaPosta wished to join a union and chose the Policeman's
Benevolent Association ("PBA") local, instead of the popular Fraternal Order
of Police ("F.O.P.") local.' The Chief of Police, however, warned Officer
LaPosta that PBA membership was off-limits to any officers.' Nevertheless,
Officer LaPosta asserted his First Amendment freedom of association and
joined the PBA, despite the Chief's threat.' In response, Officer LaPosta was:
[R]efused compensation for work assignments; denied the opportunity to attend
training sessions that would have advanced his career; singled out for disciplinary
t J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to thank John Leary, Esq. for his patience, guidance, and comments
during the drafting process. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to the
editorial board for their diligence and hard work during the editing process. Lastly, this
article would not be possible without the loving support of my family during my pursuit of
my legal education.
I Complaint at 5, LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland, No. 06-CV-5827 (DMC), 2006
WL 5201137 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2006).
2 See id. T 6, at 3.
3 Id.
4 Id.
s Id. 7, at 3; U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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action to which other officers (who were affiliated with the 'correct' union) were not
subjected; and subjected to a hostile work environment that prevented him from
performing basic work functions and advancing in rank. 6
The government as a public employer needs "far broader powers" over its
employees to conduct government affairs than those powers necessary to
conduct similar affairs concerning private citizens.' This need arises from the
interests of the public employer in efficiency and productivity that are
especially significant in the public workplace.' Such interests in efficiency,
though, must outweigh the First Amendment interests of the public employee
when decisions adversely impact the First Amendment freedoms of the
employee.'
The First Amendment protects, inter alia, the freedoms of speech and
association.o How much protection an individual receives for their speech or
associations while in the course of their employment varies depending on
whether the employee works in the public or private sector."
Public employee First Amendment speech and association protection has not
been simple. Courts have failed to demarcate speech from association,
resulting in a hodgepodge of decisions that crafted a messy and confusing
analysis. The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence for freedom of speech
claims, though, is pretty clear. For a plaintiff to demonstrate a First
Amendment claim for violation of their speech rights in the course of their
public employment, he or she must prove they spoke as a citizen on a matter of
public concern, and protection of their First Amendment interests outweighs
the public employer's interests in workplace efficiency and harmony. 2
However, since the Supreme Court has not delineated where the freedom of
speech ends and the freedom of association begins; the analysis becomes hazy
6 LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland, No. 06-CV-5827 (DMC), 2009 WL 2843901, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2009).
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion); see, e.g.,
Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 268 (2d Cir. 2007) ("When acting as an employer, 'the
State has interests ... in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."')
(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
8 See Piscottano, 511 F.3d at 269.
9 See infra Part II.A.4; cf Ramona L. Paetzold, When Are Public Employees Not Really
Public Employees? In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 92,
101 (2008) (noting private employees receive less First Amendment speech protection
because employment conflicts regarding employee speech are "private concerns").
1o See generally discussion infra Part II. The First Amendment also establishes rights
for the press, assembly, petitioning. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
1i Cf Paetzold, supra note 9, at 101 (noting private employees receive less First
Amendment speech protection because employment conflicts regarding employee speech
are "private concerns").
12 See discussion infra Part II.A.
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when a public employee asserts a First Amendment claim based on a freedom
of association theory. Courts have tried to apply this speech-specific analysis
to freedom of association claims without serious consideration of the
similarities and differences of the speech and association freedoms, so
plaintiffs, like Mr. LaPosta, who engaged in association-only activities that
involved absolutely no speech qualities received no protection because they
could not show that their associational activity constituted a matter of public
concern.1
The circuits are split over whether the associational interest should be a
"matter of public concern" in evaluating associational cases like Officer
LaPosta's-pertain to issues of government operations, for instance-as the
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test for speech cases requires. 4 The Seventh
Circuit, for example, applies the public concern test to association cases, but
the Tenth Circuit has explicitly rejected such application and, instead, applies
only the latter part of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test-the Pickering
balancing test, which considers the government's interest in efficiency and
productivity and the public employee's interest in First Amendment
protection."
Alternatively, public employees receive maximum First Amendment
protection for political affiliation and expression through the freedom of
association; such cases are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.' The courts'
different treatment of public employee association and speech implies a
recognition that speech and association are not the same and, as such, do not
necessarily require the same analysis." This distinction, unfortunately, has not
been acknowledged; courts have mechanically applied an analysis developed
for speech cases to associational cases that in no way implicate speech."
The key to determining whether the common speech or a strict scrutiny
analysis applies depends where along the speech-associational continuum a
given case lies. " As discussed, infra, the more an associational freedom is
involved, the stronger the case for a strict scrutiny analysis.20 This Comment
argues that the point at which a case involves no overt speech-thus, is purely
associational-should trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.'
'3 See discussion infra Part III.
14 See discussion infra Part Ill.
'5 See discussion infra Part III.
16 See discussion infra Part II.B.
'7 See discussion infra Part II.
' See discussion infra Part III.B.
'9 See discussion infra Part IV.
20 See discussion infra Part IV.D-E.
21 See discussion infra Part IV.
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Part II will discuss the muddled evolution of public employee speech law
from Pickering v. Board of Education through the recent Supreme Court
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, including the Pickering balancing test and the
public concern requirement, as well as the recognition of freedom of
association under the First Amendment in the public employment context. Part
III takes up the current circuit split over the application of the public concern
test to association cases. Part IV asserts within the speech/association
continuum exists a bright line distinction between hybrid speech/association
and pure association cases and argues a strict scrutiny analysis should apply in
pure association cases.
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION PROTECTIONS: FAR FROM DISTINCT
A. Freedom of Speech: Pickering/Connick/Garcetti-The Narrow(ing)
Approach
According to Justice Souter, "[o]pen speech by a private citizen on a matter
of public importance lies at the heart of expression subject to protection by the
First Amendment."22 The choice of a citizen to become an employee of the
government, though, does not automatically forfeit First Amendment
protection.23 Some First Amendment protection is advantageous, not only for
the employee but society as well, as the unique position of government
employees in public service contributes valuable perspective to the public
discourse.24 Additionally, a public employee, while serving in an important and
unique role in the workforce, is still a citizen.25
Still, public employees waive certain private rights upon entry into public
service26 because the public employer has an interest in an efficient and
productive workforce and needs sufficient power over the workforce to ensure
proficiency in services.27 Moreover, public employees, in their capacity as
public servants and government representatives, are constantly under the
22 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
23 See id. at 417 (majority opinion).
24 See id at 419. The Supreme Court in City of San Diego v. Roe notes without the
"informed opinion" of public employees, the value of public discourse regarding important
concerns would be diminished. 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam).
25 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
26 See id at 418. Contra McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892)
("A policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman.").
27 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
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watchful eye of the public at-large and could persuade the community on
points of view contrary to government positions; such dissention could
negatively affect efficiency and productivity.28
Consequently, recent Supreme Court decisions have attempted to find an
adequate balance among the rights of the public employee to receive First
Amendment protection as a citizen, the need for the public to have valuable
public discourse, and the government's interest of in efficiency and
productivity of its workforce to carry out "important public functions."29
1. Balancing Pickering
In Pickering v. Board ofEducation, Marvin Pickering, a teacher, sent a letter
to the editors of a local newspaper criticizing decisions by the Board of
Education regarding financial expenditures, treatment of teachers, and quality
of schools' facilities." He signed the letter with his full name but asserted his
opinion represented his views as a private citizen." Consequently, the Board
terminated Pickering on the basis that Pickering had forfeited his right to speak
out on school policies when he was hired as a teacher.32
Pickering sued and claimed his letter fell within the purview of the First
Amendment." The Supreme Court, giving birth to the infamous Pickering
balancing test, weighed "the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees."34 Acknowledging that Pickering's letter was directed at the
Board, and not his immediate supervisors, the Court found his speech did not
sufficiently constitute insubordination nor cause workplace disharmony. "
Moreover, Pickering's position as a teacher was not directly related to the
substance of the letter; the Court held Pickering's First Amendment interests
28 See id. at 419.
29 See id. at 420.
30 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). The impetus for the letter was a
proposed transportation tax increase to pay for school district expenses. Id at app. 575-78.
31 Id. at app. 578. Pickering stated, "I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and
voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the
administration." Id; cf infra Part II.A.3 (discussing adoption by Supreme Court of "as a
citizen" requirement for First Amendment public employee speech protection).
32 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-65, 567.
3 Id. at 565.
34 Id. at 568; see EDWARDS, ET AL., FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE: A
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ISSUES AFFECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 31 (Am. Bar
Assoc. 1998).
3 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70.
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outweighed the State's interest in abating insubordination and workplace
disharmony. 6
2. Connick's Concern With Public Concern
In Connick v. Myers, the Court affirmed the application of the Pickering
balancing test to public employee speech cases but narrowed the protection of
the First Amendment." Particularly, the Court held that a public employee
does not receive First Amendment protection unless the employee speaks
regarding "matters of public concern." "
Myers, an Assistant District Attorney, opposed a transfer proposal from her
supervisor, Connick.39 She voiced her opposition to Connick, but he transferred
her nonetheless.40 Myers then circulated a questionnaire to other assistant
district attorneys in the office to gather information from her colleagues in
regards to their opinions about the transfer policy as well as whether coworkers
perceived pressure from their superiors to support political campaigns.4 After
learning of the questionnaire, Connick terminated Myers for her rejection of
the transfer and insubordination in distribution of the questionnaire.42 Myers
sued and claimed her termination violated her First Amendment freedom of
speech.4
The Supreme Court examined the evolution of rights afforded to public
employees over the course of the twentieth century, concluding precedent
afforded public employees liberty to engage in public affairs without
interference from the government solely on the basis that such engagement is
subversive." The Court found that one of the questions in Myers'
questionnaire related to a matter of public concern, which was one of the
factors of Connick's termination decision, namely, the question regarding
perceived pressure from superiors to work for political campaigns.45 The Court
36 See id at 569-70 (discussing the State's interest as an employer in a harmonious
workplace to maintain efficiency); see also id at 574 (finding Pickering's First Amendment
interests overcome the State's interest as an employer).
37 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
38 See id. at 147. The Court explained further that federal courts are not the "appropriate
forum" to review "personnel decisions taken by a public agency" regarding the employee's
behavior. Id.
39 Id. at 140.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 141.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 144-45.
45 Id. at 149.
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applied the Pickering balancing test, but still upheld Myers' termination.46
3. Speaking as a Garcetti Citizen
Pickering and Connick left open the question of whether the capacity in
which a public employee speaks is a dispositive factor in First Amendment
protection.47 In Garcetti v. Ceballos,48 the Supreme Court addressed this
issue.49
Ceballos, a deputy district attorney, received a call from a defense attorney
requesting Ceballos to investigate alleged discrepancies in a search warrant
affidavit."o The investigation uncovered major discrepancies in the affidavit;
Ceballos prepared a memorandum of his findings to his supervisors." Despite
Ceballos' findings concerning the affidavit, the district attorney proceeded
with the prosecution.52 At trial, Ceballos testified for the defense as to his
findings of inaccuracies in the affidavit.53 Subsequently, according to Ceballos,
as retaliation he was reassigned to another position, and was passed over for a
promotion because of his testimony; he sued, alleging the retaliation violated
his First Amendment rights.54
The Supreme Court narrowed the Pickering balancing test, holding that
"when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline."" The Court looked to Pickering and its progeny and recognized a
46 Id at 150, 154.
47 Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) ("[Tlhe amounts
expended on athletics which Pickering reported erroneously were matters of public record
on which his position as a teacher in the district did not qualify him to speak with any
greater authority than any other taxpayer.") (emphasis added), with Connick, 461 U.S. at
147 ("We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review
the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior.") (emphasis added).
48 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
49 Id. at 413.
50 Id
51 Id. at 414.
52 Id
s3 Id. at 414-15.
54 Id at 415.
ss Id at 421.
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two-pronged analysis for public employee speech First Amendment claims:
The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of
public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of
action based on his or her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then
the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The question [then] becomes
whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general public. This consideration
reflects the importance of the relationship between the speaker's expressions and
employment. A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it
acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech
that has some potential to affect the entity's operations. 56
These inquiries, the Court recognized, present difficulties due to the wide
spectrum of factual scenarios in which disparaging statements by public
employees might lead to termination or discipline.57 Notwithstanding, the
Court aimed to uphold the purposes of public employees' First Amendment
speech protection and held, "so long as employees are speaking as citizens
about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions
that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively."58
The fact that Ceballos wrote his memorandum as an official opinion in the
course of his official duties was controlling; the fact that he expressed his
opinions in the office, as opposed to publicly, and spoke to matters of his
employment, however, were not dispositive.5 ' Based on these findings, the
56 Id. at 418 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). While the Court describes its analysis
as a two-step approach, the analysis is more easily understood as a three-step analysis. First,
it must be determined whether the employee spoke as a citizen. If the answer is no, meaning
the employee spoke within their official duties, then the analysis proceeds. Note that
because the issue of whether or not Ceballos spoke as a citizen was not in dispute, the Court
does not provide guidance as to how the analysis proceeds if as a matter of fact the
employee spoke outside their official duties as a citizen. See infra discussion
accompanying note 64. Next, the analysis turns to the subject-matter of the employee
speech as a matter of public concern. If the speech was not relevant to a matter of public
concern, the employee receives no First Amendment protection. If the speech was on a
matter of public concern, the analysis continues. The last step balances the government
employer interest in restricting the speech, which essentially is the Pickering balancing test.
See supra Part ll.A. 1.
5 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968))
(quotations omitted).
58 Id. at 415.
5 Id. at 420-21. Justice Kennedy noted:
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a
private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself had commissioned or created. Contrast, for example, the expressions
made by the speaker in Pickering, whose letter to the newspaper had no official
significance and bore similarities to letters submitted by numerous citizens every day.
Id. at 421-22 (citations omitted).
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Court held Ceballos did not have a claim to speech protection under the First
Amendment."o
The Court postulated that only affording protection for speech in instances
where the public employee spoke as a citizen would not chill public employee
participation in public discourse, as public service does not forfeit their
participation privately; the First Amendment still provides protection."
Further, exclusion of official speech from First Amendment protection grants
public employers acceptable managerial freedom to ensure consistent official
communications.62 Such a rule is reasonable and limited, Justice Kennedy
posited, as public employees do not receive any less First Amendment speech
protection than private employees, and the rule only proscribes dissident or
insubordinate speech expressed in the course of official duties, not "statements
or complaints (such as those at issue in cases like Pickering and Connick) that
are made outside the duties of employment." 63
Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti attempted to synthesize and simplify the
First Amendment protection of public employee speech while at the same time
giving deference to the need of the government employer to regulate the
workplace so as to best accomplish its goals. Synthesizing these cases, the
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test emerges to analyze First Amendment claims
by public employees for speech protection: (1) the public employee spoke as a
.citizen; (2) on a matter of public concern; and (3) the First Amendment
60 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422, 424.
61 Id. at 422.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 424 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138 (1983)). The Court pointed to a bright line between public statements made
within official duties and statements made outside those duties, or as a citizen:
Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing their official
duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of
activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government. The same goes for
writing a letter to a local newspaper or discussing politics with a co-worker.
Id. at 423 (citations omitted); cf Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, app. 576 (1968)
(finding Mr. Pickering wrote a letter to the editors of the local newspaper and signed the
letter "as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher").
Justice Kennedy encouraged public employers to develop internal procedures, for
example, that would provide employees an opportunity to offer criticism so as to
"discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of expression is to state their views
in public." Id. at 424. But compare id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting), for the argument that
the rule does not provide a bright line between speech that is and is not in the course of an
employee's official duties. Instead, Justice Stevens argues the rule encourages employees to
publicly express concerns, not speak with supervisors first. Id.
The Court also limited application of the holding to the facts. The parties did not dispute
that Ceballos wrote the memorandum pursuant to his duties, so the Court did not have the
opportunity to enunciate a clear analysis for when the scope of the employee's duties is at
issue. Id at 424.
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interests of the employee outweigh the interests of the public employer
(Pickering balancing test).' The next section will demonstrate the confines of
the second and third elements to illustrate how the analysis impacts different
fact scenarios. 65
4. Balancing the Public Concern
a. A Matter of Public Concern
Speech of a matter of public concern appertains "to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community."66 Courts look to the "content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.""7
Moreover, the inquiry is relevant only when such statements negatively affect
public employer efficiency."
According to the Connick Court, matters of public concern include
statements made to inform the public of a governmental arm's breach of
duties." The public concern inquiry, however, "is not an exact science,"" and
the contentious nature of the statement is of no consequence to the analysis."
Specifically, matters of public concern have included information or
64 The speech must also have been a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's
adverse decision, and the adverse decision would not have occurred in the absence of the
employee's speech. See Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977) (discussing the but-for causation analysis of public employee First Amendment
speech claims).
65 To maintain the narrow scope of this Comment, the analysis will focus only on the
relevant prongs of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test: the public concern and Pickering
balancing prongs. See infra Part II.A.4.
66 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
67 Id. at 147-48; cf infra text accompanying note 88 (noting that context of the
employee's statement is also relevant for the Pickering balance). But see Connick, 461 U.S.
at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court distorts the balancing analysis required under Pickering by suggesting
that one factor, the context in which a statement is made, is to be weighed twice - first
in determining whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern and
then in deciding whether the statement adversely affected the government's interest as
an employer.").
68 Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Plaintiff carries
the burden to demonstrate their speech related to a matter of public concern. Eng v. Cooley,
552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
69 Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
70 Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Weeks v.
Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2001)).
7' Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987).
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statements about: sexual harassment by public employees,72 wasteful
government spending," corruption,74 and public safety" to name a few.
The public concern scope is limited, though." If the content of the statement
only indirectly relates to a public concern, for example, the speaker has an
ulterior or personal motive for making the statement, the court might find the
statement to fail the public concern threshold. Simplistically, statements
about personal grievances irrelevant to public perception of government
operations are generally outside the scope of public concern. In addition,
"passing references to public safety" if unrelated to the main purport of the
statement, offset any connection to public concern."
In Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, Plaintiff Dixon was an investigative assistant to the
Oklahoma Board of Veterinary and Medical Examiners ("OBVME")
72 Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 182 (6th Cir. 2008). In
Hughes, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court finding of failure to show public
concern where a public employee, after being sought out by a newspaper reporter, discussed
with the reporter pending allegations of sexual harassment against the executive director of
the agency, and the employee's opinion that another employee was terminated for
suggesting an investigation of the executive director and the allegations. 542 F.3d at 181-82.
7 Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In Chaklos, the Seventh
Circuit held that a letter to a state procurement official criticizing an award of a government
contract without competitive bidding on the basis that competitive bidding would be cost
beneficial was a matter of public concern. Id.
74 Huppert, 547 F.3d at 704.
7 Redd v. Dougherty, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The Redd Court
held statements by a correctional officer to a detective concerning a crime she witnessed
were of a matter of public concern. Id.
76 Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 709-710 (9th Cir. 2009).
n Id. at 710. In McCullough v. University ofArkansas for Medical Sciences, the Eighth
Circuit found a primary personal motive and rejected the plaintiffs claim of speech as a
matter of public concern because the plaintiff "filed his complaints only after the college
asked him to respond to the complaints of sexual harassment against him. He thus did not
inform the public about alleged sexual harassment at [the school] in the first instance on his
own initiative." 559 F.3d 855, 866 (8th Cir. 2009).
78 Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2009) quoted in Desrochers, 572 F.3d
at 711. In Desrochers, police officers filed a grievance against their supervisors, citing the
managerial approach of the supervisors negatively impacting unit efficiency. 572 F.3d at
706-07. The Ninth Circuit held the police officers' grievance did not address a matter of
public concern because the allegations in the grievance did not show incompetence or
malfeasance by the supervisors. Id. at 712. In a comical but illustrative point, the Ninth
Circuit posited:
What if we judges prohibited our law clerks from taking coffee breaks? Suppose they
responded with a memorandum complaining about the action. While they might
assert-perhaps fairly-that caffeine deprivation would adversely affect their
performance, morale, efficiency, and thus, their competency, no one would seriously




investigator."9 Dixon protested against the involvement of OBVME and its
funds in a dogfighting ring investigation on the basis that such involvement
exceeded the scope of its purpose; she expressed such opinions to her
supervisor and the investigator, but her comments were ignored."o Dixon
discussed her concerns about OBVME involvement in the investigation, as
well as her complaints about the investigator and her supervisor with her
veterinarian, a legislative committee member of a veterinarian organization in
Oklahoma in hopes that he would push the legislative committee to intervene
and stop the investigator."
As part of its public concern analysis of Dixon's statements, the Tenth
Circuit separated her statements into three categories: (1) complaints to her
supervisor; (2) complaints to her veterinarian that OBVME involvement was
improper; and (3) complaints to her veterinarian about the investigator and her
supervisor.82 The Dixon Court held the discussion with her veterinarian
regarding the improper involvement of OBVME was a matter of public
concern, but the other statements were not. 13
The Dixon decision highlights the close and fact-intensive analysis
necessary to determine matters of public concern, as well as the unpredictable
nature of such analyses. Such unpredictability challenges the hasty extension
of the public concern analysis to freedom of association claims.
b. Pickering Balancing
Upon a finding the employee spoke on an issue of public concern, the
analysis, as well as the burden of proof, shifts to the Pickering balancing test.84
The employer interests weighed are workplace harmony between employees,
79 Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1297-98 (10th Cir. 2009). Dixon was privy to
confidential information about the investigations; she was to maintain confidentiality. Id. at
1298.
80 Id. at 1298-99.
81 Id. at 1298-1300.
82 Id. at 1303. The district court, however, did not distinguish Ms. Dixon's statements
into different categories. Id.; cf supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Court in Connick distinguished between different instances of speech in its public concern
analysis by considering the questions in the questionnaire independently).
83 Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1303.
84 Cf City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) ("Applying these principles to
the instant case, there is no difficulty in concluding that Roe's expression does not qualify as
a matter of public concern under any view of the public concern test. He fails the threshold
test and Pickering balancing does not come into play."); Connick v. Myers 461 U.S. 138,
149-150 (1983) (noting the state bears the burden of justifying the adverse employment
decision through the Pickering balancing analysis).
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efficiency, and productivity." Against the employer interests, courts weigh the
potential chilling effect," and the private nature of the employee's speech."
The "manner, time, and place" of the employee's statements are at the fulcrum
of this balance." Courts afford deference to the decisions of the employer to
avoid "constitutionaliz[ing] the employee grievance."89
The Pickering Court found Pickering's position as a teacher and his
relationship with the superintendent too far removed to claim "personal loyalty
and confidence" to be essential to Board productivity; thus, Mr. Pickering's
speech was protected."o In Connick, though, the Court concluded the
questionnaire affected office efficiency and operation,9 1 as certain questions in
the questionnaire potentially undermined office relations.92 Accordingly, the
questionnaire was more of a personal grievance against her transfer, and the
Court upheld Myers' termination."
The public concern and Pickering balancing tests seek to give public
employers some leverage and power to control their workplaces by severely
limiting the scope of protection of employees' speech. This limited scope
makes sense; statements by employees could easily be interpreted as
statements by the government and incite public backlash. Limiting the scope of
protection acts as a deterrence against impulsive speech and seeks to make
employees think twice before they open their mouth. Is such deterrence and
aforethought contemplation necessary to government function, however, when
85 ISIDORE SILVER, 2 PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE AND DISCIPLINE 1055 (Aspen
Publishers, 3d ed. 2001).
86 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (noting that threats of
termination are a form of a chilling effect on speech).
87 Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 n.13 (1983) ("Employee speech which transpires entirely on
the employee's own time, and in non-work areas of the office, bring different factors into
the Pickering calculus, and might lead to a different conclusion.").
88 Id. at 152.
89 Id. at 154 ("It would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great principles of free
expression if the Amendment's safeguarding of a public employee's right, as a citizen, to
participate in discussions concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to
constitutionalize the employee grievance . . . .").
90 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570; see supra Part II.A.1 (discussing facts in Pickering); cf
discussion infra Part III.B (discussing Pickering balancing test applied in Flanagan v.
Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989)).
9' Connick, 461 U.S. at 151.
92 Id. at 152.
3 EDWARDS, ET AL., supra note 34, at 36; cf Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1309
(10th Cir. 2009) (holding the "termination of an employee for unauthorized disclosure of
information about an ongoing investigation" to be "necessary to prevent the disruption of
official functions or to insure effective performance by the employee."); discussion infra
notes 146-154 and accompanying text (discussing Pickering balancing application in Balton
v. City of Milwaukee, 113 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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a public employee joins an organization?
B. Freedom of Association: The Strict Approach
"It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty"
protected by the First Amendment. 94 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
the Supreme Court recognized an individual's right to freely associate as an
implicit freedom included in the First Amendment." In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Supreme Court formally recognized the "right to associate
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment,"' as protection of such activities from governmental intrusion
would be meaningless "unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort
towards those ends were not also guaranteed."" The freedom to associate is
necessary for preservation of "political and cultural diversity" as well as to
"shield[] dissident expression from suppression by the majority." 9 8 These
choices receive protection "because of the role of such relationships in
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme." 99 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the government could
severely burden the freedom of association so long as such burdens "serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms."'
94 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see generally Faina Milman-Sivan, Freedom of Association as a
Core Labor Right and the ILO: Toward a Normative Framework, 3 LAW & ETHICS HUMAN
RIGHTS 109, 110 (2009) (discussing the nature of freedom of association and collective
bargaining as a fundamental right and "meta-norm" within the UN's International Labour
Organization).
95 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.
96 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984). The Court in Roberts
recognized two categories of association protected under the First Amendment: intimate
association and expressive association. Laura Curry Sloan, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment Right of Association-Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 33 U. KAN. L. REv.
771, 771 (1985).; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-29.
Intimate association includes the "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. Expressive association, on the other
hand, recognizes "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
protected by the First Amendment - speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and the exercise of religion." Id. at 618; Sloan, supra, at 771.
97 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
98 id.
99 Id. at 618; Sloan, supra note 96, at 771.
100 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005). Similarly,
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In Elrod v. Burns, plaintiffs, non-civil service employees of the local
sheriffs department, were discharged from their positions because they were
not members of, nor supported, the Democratic Party."o' The Supreme Court
considered whether plaintiffs' discharge solely on the basis of their
nonaffiliation with a political party violated the First Amendment.' 2
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan equated the actions of the sheriff s
department to be "tantamount to coerced belief,""' as protection of the choice
to associate with a political party is essential to the tenets of the First
Amendment. '" The Court found the dismissals to be unconstitutional
violations of plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment,' 5 as plaintiffs were
employed in nonpolitical positions, not in the types of government
employment where "party affiliation may be an acceptable requirement."106
Moreover, the dismissals did not promote efficiency and productivity through
the least restrictive means available."' Any government interest the patronage
system advanced did not justify the violation of First Amendment protection.' 0
state regulations that "impose lesser burdens," might "justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions" upon a showing of "important regulatory interests" by the government. See
Clingman, 544 U.S. at 587 (referencing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520, U.S.
351, 358 (2007)).
The requirement of a compelling state interest to justify government infringement upon a
person's expressive association is also known as the "preferred freedom" concept. Sloan,
supra note 95, at 775.
1o 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976).
102 See id. at 349.
103 See id at 355.
104 Id. at 357 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)).
1os See id at 372-373 (finding the dismissals unconstitutional under the first and
fourteenth amendments).
106 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (discussing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
375 (1976)).
107 See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373. "[P]atronage dismissals cannot be justified by their
contribution to the proper functioning of our democratic process through their assistance to
partisan politics since political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally
effective methods." Id. at 372-73.
'os Id. at 373.
In another patronage case, Branti v. Finkel, the Court held the county government could
not condition employment of an assistant public defender upon their support of the political
party in control. 445 U.S. at 519. Because a public defender in representing indigent
defendants has a duty only to their individual clients, not to the public as adversaries to the
government, partisan political interests are not germane. Id. The Court also noted:
The primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels the office of privately
retained counsel. Although it is true that appointed counsel serves pursuant to statutory
authorization and in furtherance of the federal interest in insuring effective
representation of criminal defendants, his duty is not to the public at large, except in
that general way.
See id. (citing Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)); see also Rutan v. Republican
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In United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO, the Supreme Court, applying a strict scrutiny analysis,
considered the impact of the Hatch Act on the First Amendment rights of
federal employees.o9 At the time of the Court's decision in 1973, Section
7324(a)(2) of the Hatch Act prohibited an executive agency employee from
taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns""o
Evaluating the history leading up to the Hatch Act, as well as findings included
in subsequent amendments,"' Justice White concluded that sufficient bases for
limiting the First Amendment political expression of federal employees
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1990) (holding the enforcement of a patronage system in
employment by state governor's office to be an unconstitutional infringement on
employees' First Amendment rights).
109 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413, U.S.
548, 564-565 (1973) [hereinafter Letter Carriers]; 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2006).
The strict scrutiny analysis is apparent by some of the Court's language. To evaluate the
interest of the federal government in restricting federal employee's political activities, the
Court applied a Pickering balancing test. Id. at 564-65; see supra Part II.A.4.b (describing
the Pickering balancing test). Contra infra Part IV.E.2 (arguing the Pickering balancing test
as-applied today should be inapplicable to pure freedom of association claims). Specifically,
the important end of the federal government is the "impartial execution of the laws," so "[ilt
seems fundamental . . . that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those
working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of
Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a political party." Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65.
Resembling a "least restrictive means test," the Court considered as part of its analysis
that the restraints on federal employee partisan political activities "are not aimed at
particular political parties, groups, or points of view, bur apply equally to all partisan
activities of the type described [in the Hatch Act]." Id. at 564.
In dicta, the Court outlined the boundaries of what would be a constitutional constraint of
the First Amendment freedom of association for federal employees:
Congress had, and has, the power to prevent [federal employees] from holding a party
office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers. An
Act of Congress going no farther would in our view unquestionably be valid. So
would it be if, in plain and understandable language, the statute forbade activities such
as organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities
for a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively
managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or
circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate
for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a political party
convention.
Id. at 556.
"o See An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (Hatch Act), Pub. L. No. 76-
252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), removing this
restriction), quoted in Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 568. But cf Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at
568 ("Section 7324(b) privileges an employee to vote as he chooses and to express his
opinion on political subjects and candidates .. . ."); 5 U.S.C. § 7324(b).
"' See Letter Carriers, 413, U.S. at 557-564 (retracing the political concerns underlying
the development of the Hatch Act).
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existed." 2 In addition, the statute, according to the Court, was neither
overbroad nor vague, as the statute expressly distinguished between prohibited
and permitted political expression and provided procedures for an employee to
ascertain the legal implications of their conduct."'
Elrod and Letter Carriers highlight the Court's recognition of the distinction
between speech and association, and the need to treat those freedoms
differently by affording association cases the heightened strict scrutiny
analysis." 4 In addition, the freedom of association line of cases applies a much
clearer analysis than the freedom of speech cases."' Both lines require a fact-
intensive analysis, but, as will become clear, the complex freedom of speech
analysis drawn from Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti is far too complex and
discretionary, which has led to an inconsistent and sometimes mind-boggling
application of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis by the lower courts.
III. CIRCUITS NOT SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: PUBLIC CONCERN-
FOCUSED ANALYSIS BLURS SPEECH/ASSOCIATIONAL
DISTINCTION
A. Public Concern Matters: Piscottano v. Murphy
Plaintiffs were employees of the Connecticut Department of Corrections
(DOC); the DOC implemented adverse employment actions against the
plaintiffs based on the plaintiffs' affiliation with the Outlaws Motorcycle Club
(Outlaws)."' DOC regulations proscribed "engaging in conduct that
112 Id. at 557-64. Justice White stated that the history of the Hatch Act and subsequent
amendments suggested the Court's judgment:
[W]ould no more than confirm the judgment of history, a judgment made by this
country over the last century that it is in the best interest of the country, indeed
essential, that federal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than
political service, and that the political influence of federal employees on others and on
the electoral process should be limited.
Id.
"3 Id. at 579-80.
"14 See infra Part IV.E.
"5 See infra Part IV.E.
116 Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2007). According to reports by
local and federal law enforcement authorities, the Outlaws Motorcycle Club was "involved
in the production and distribution of methamphetamines and in the transportation and
distribution of ecstasy, marijuana, and cocaine;" rivals of the commonly known motorcycle
gang Hells Angels; "other criminal activities including assault, kidnapping, weapons and
explosives violations, arson, theft of motorcycles and motorcycle parts, fraud, money
laundering, and extortion;" and prostitution. Id. at 254. Surveillance by local and state police
of Outlaws Motorcycle Club parties revealed plaintiffs' involvement in the club either as
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constitutes, or gives rise to the appearance of a conflict of interest" and
"engaging in unprofessional or illegal behavior, both on and off duty, that
could in any manner reflect negatively on the [DOC]."" DOC officials found
plaintiffs in violation of department directives, terminated two plaintiffs, and
ordered counseling for the remaining plaintiffs based on their affiliation with
the Outlaws."' Plaintiffs filed claims alleging violations of "their First
Amendment and due process rights to freedom of expressive association and
freedom of intimate association by disciplining them on account of their
membership in, and their association with members of the Outlaws.""'
The Second Circuit, citing the Supreme Court in Healy v. James, posited
that "[g]uilt by association alone, without establishing that an individual's
association poses the threat feared by the Government, is an impermissible
basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights."' 20 The Court subjected the
"threat feared by the government" to a public concern analysis.12' Public
concern can be demonstrated in two ways: (1) the organization advocates for
issues deemed a matter of public concern; or (2) an individual's membership,
which constitutes vicarious "endorsement of the nature and character of the
organization," where the organization's mission or purpose is a matter of
public concern.'22
In Piscottano, the plaintiffs conceded the Outlaws did not advocate for
issues of public concern, so the Court imputed the findings of criminal activity
to the plaintiffs.'23 The plaintiffs were not entitled to First Amendment
protection, as the membership in or affiliation with the Outlaws "had the
potential in several ways to disrupt and reflect negatively on DOC's
members or by association. See id. at 254-55.
''7 Id at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted).
''8 Id. at 253.
"9 Id at 252.
120 Id. at 268 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
121 See Piscottano, 511 F.3d at 273-74 ("[I]n order to prevail on a First Amendment
freedom-of-expressive-association claim, a government employee must show, inter alia,
that his expressive association involved a matter of public concern - just as would a
government employee complaining of a violation of his right to freedom of speech.").
Accord Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying public concern analysis to
freedom of association claim); Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1993); Akers v.
McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir. 2003).
122 Piscottano, 511 F.3d at 274.
123 Id. ("[W]e accept plaintiffs' concession to the extent that it meant that they are not
engaged in expressive conduct on matters of public concern vicariously by reason of
advocacy by the [Outlaws] itself"). Id. The Court not only imputed the activities of the local
chapter, but of the entire national organization. See id. at 275 (noting "[t]he inference that
their endorsement extends to other chapters of the Outlaws is supported by [the record] ...
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operations, and that DOC's interest in maintaining the efficiency, security, and
integrity of its operations outweighed the associational interests of those
plaintiffs.""2
B. Balancing Nonverbal Protection Without Public Concern: Flanagan v.
Munger
The Tenth Circuit has taken a different approach to the freedom of
association claims by public employees.'25 In Flanagan v. Munger, the Tenth
Circuit rejected extension of the Pickering/Connick test to an associational
claim based on employees' membership in an association unrelated to their
employment.'26 The Court applied only the Pickering balancing test, as "[a]
court can still compare an employee's interest in free speech and his
employer's interest in the efficient functioning of government even with
nonverbal protected expression."I27 The Court elucidated:
The principle that emerges is that all public employee speech that by content is within
the general protection of the first amendment is entitled to at least qualified protection
against public employer chilling action except that which, realistically viewed, is of
purely "personal concern" to the employee - most typically, a private personnel
124 Id. at 278. The Court looked to DOC's interests in promoting staff safety and
reducing risks of inmate violence; preventing plaintiffs' associations from interfering with
investigations with other law enforcement agencies; avoiding appearance of impropriety
through employment of correctional officers with the Outlaws; and ensuring correctional
officers are not tempted to treat inmates unfairly because of the inmate's association with a
rival group. See id. at 277.
125 Accord Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
the public concern requirement "inapplicable to freedom of association claims."); Shrum v.
City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding public concern analysis does not
apply in cases of retaliation for union activities); Teague v. City of Flower Mound, 179 F.3d
377 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding public concern analysis does not apply to "mixed speech"
claims).
126 See Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1562 (10th Cir. 1989). The Court
elaborated:
Although the Supreme Court has extended the Pickering/Connick test to a case which
involves speech at work but not about work, we do not believe that the
Pickering/Connick public concern test logically extends two more steps to this case in
which a public employee (1) engages in nonverbal protected expression which is (2)
neither at work nor about work.
Id.
127 Id. at 1562-1563. In support, the Court reasoned:
The alternative test should be whether the speech involved is 'protected expression.' If
the speech involved is protected expression, then the second half of the existing
Pickering test-the balancing between the employee's right to free speech and the






Plaintiffs were police officers who entered into a video rental store venture
that also rented out adult films.12 9 The Chief of Police received an anonymous
letter alleging that police officers in his station co-owned a pomography store;
the Chief ordered an investigation.'o The investigation concluded plaintiffs'
ownership of the store violated departmental regulations of off-duty
employment.'' The Chief notified plaintiffs of the investigation and asked
them to remove all adult films from the store inventory or be subject to a
reprimand; the plaintiffs complied.'32
A local newspaper reporter contacted plaintiffs regarding a tip received that
they operated a pornography store and plaintiffs would be reprimanded.'
Plaintiffs arranged a meeting with the Chief to discuss the reporter's interest in
the issue, and the Chief, "believing he had the consent of plaintiffs," revealed
to the reporter details of the investigation of plaintiffs, as well as the plaintiffs'
reprimands.' 34 The newspaper ran numerous articles based on the information
the Chief disclosed.' The Chief, despite Plaintiffs compliance with the
Chief's request to remove the adult films from inventory to avoid reprimand,
then issued written reprimands to the plaintiffs for violations of department
regulations, including conduct unbecoming of an officer and for failure to
obtain approval for off-duty employment.1 36
Plaintiffs filed suit; they alleged defendants violated their first amendment
right of association."' The Court, applying only the Pickering balancing test,
found Plaintiffs' expression protected by the First Amendment.' 8 In applying
its reasoning for rejecting the public concern test to the facts of the case, the
Court explained:
[T]he language used by the Supreme Court in explaining the public concern test
indicates its inapplicability to the present fact situation. The Supreme Court requires
that the employee's speech comment 'upon matters of public concern.' It is difficult to
comprehend how each of the officer's owning of a one-quarter interest in a video store
which rents a small portion of sexually explicit videos is making a 'comment' on any
128 Id. at 1565 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985)) .
129 Id. at 1560. Adult films comprised less than four percent of the video inventory. Id.
130 Id.
13' Id. at 1560.
132 Id. at 1560-61.
133 Id. at 1561.
134 Id.
'3 See id. at 1561.
136 Id.
'37 See id. (detailing how one of the plaintiffs also alleged retaliation by the Chief for
"[failure] to reappoint him as deputy chief, a position he had held in the department for ten
years").
138 Id. at 1562-1565 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
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subject, especially a subject of public concern. Owning a store that rents movies isn't
necessarily commentar about the desirability of these films. This is not debate or
explicit verbal speech.'
Balancing the plaintiffs' interest in engaging in their speech, which the
Court found to be substantial,140 against the "attenuated" interest of the police
department in preventing "direct disruption, by the speech itself, of the [police
department's] internal operations and employment relationships," 4' the Court
found the Pickering balance to favor plaintiffs.'42 The Court specifically held
that the Chief violated the free speech and press rights of the plaintiffs "by
prohibiting them from selling or renting sexually explicit video tapes and by
reprimanding them for engaging in that activity."'43
The material facts of Piscottano and Flanagan are very similar. Both cases
involve choices by public employees to affiliate with organizations unrelated
'9 Id. at 1563.
140 Id at 1565.
141 Id. at 1566 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Berger v. Battaglia, the Fourth Circuit applied the
Pickering balancing test where a police officer performed off-duty in blackface, which
members of the public found offensive. 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985). The Court noted the
factual differences between the facts in Berger and Pickering, but, according to the
Flanagan Court, "gave no reasoning for extending Pickering" and seemed to apply "the test
because of the inertia of previous decisions applying Pickering in employment cases.
Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564 n.7 (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). The Flanagan Court analogized the facts
of the instant case and Berger: "[b]oth cases involved off-duty entertainment "speech" by
police officers which did not "add" to debate. Thus, the Berger case provides a persuasive
prior resolution of very similar issues ..... Id. at 1564 n.7 (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779
F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
The Flanagan Court found the police department's interest in preventing plaintiffs'
expression to be attenuated because the police department's justification, that "if members
of the public knew that offers were renting [sexually explicit videos] would erode the
public's respect and confidence in the police department . . . . thereby inhibiting the
efficiency and effectiveness of [the department] in the community", could not be sustained
where no direct evidence in the record existed of disruption or impact on close working
relationships, workplace efficiency or productivity. See id. at 1566.
The Flanagan Court further reasoned that the department's articulated interest in
preventing the plaintiffs' expression was similar to the "heckler's veto," which Supreme
Court precedent has rebuffed "as a justification for curtailing 'offensive' speech in order to
prevent public disorder." Id. at 1566 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)). The heckler's veto refers to disapproval
of speech simply on the basis that the speech is offensive to members of the public and "for
that reason may not cooperate with law enforcement officers in the future." Id. For this
reason, as well as the above-discussed reasons, the Court characterized the department's
case as "revolv[ing] solely around evidence of the potential disruption of the department's
external relationships and operations." Id.




to their public employment. Also, none of the plaintiffs in either case spoke
out, directly or indirectly, about their affiliation with their respective
organizations. Nevertheless, the courts in both cases forced an analysis tailored
specifically for instances of public employee speech.'"
IV. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH IN PURELY
ASSOCIATIONAL CASES
Application of the analyses in the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti and
Elrod/Letter Carriers lines of cases reveal two important fundamentals of the
relationship between the First Amendment speech and association freedoms.
First, speech and association are not intrinsically related; they can be mutually
exclusive. Second, while speech is not necessary for association, and vice
versa, they are related, and sometimes speech and association are so
intertwined that it becomes difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish the
two.'45 With these notions in mind, courts can determine where cases lie along
the speech-association continuum in order to determine whether to apply a
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti or Elrod/Letter Carriers analysis.
A. Pure Associational and Hybrid Speech/Association Cases
In Balton v. City of Milwaukee,'46 Plaintiffs were assistant chief dispatchers,
not members of the union for the "rank and file" firefighters.'47 Assistant chief
dispatchers were eligible to become members of the Chief Officers Association
("Association"), an organization that informally advocated for members on
contract issues.14 Plaintiffs both joined the Association under the assumption
membership would provide salary and benefit increases.149
After joining the Association as dues-paying members, plaintiffs no longer
saw the benefit of their membership in the Association and ceased payment of
their dues.' The treasurer of the Association informed plaintiffs of their
delinquent dues, and, after the plaintiffs still did not pay, the treasurer reported
144 In fact, in Flanagan, the Tenth Circuit admitted the facts did not at all touch upon
speech but applied the Pickering balancing test anyway, albeit dubiously. See supra notes
139-141 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning for the holding in Flanagan).
145 Cf infra Part IV.C.
146 Balton v. City of Milwaukee, 133 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 1998).
147 Id at 1037.
148 Id. at 1037-38.
149 Id. at 1038. Until 1993, Plaintiffs were not eligible to join the association because of
their status as assistant chief dispatchers. Id.
150 Id.
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the non-payment to the deputy chief.'' Not long after, the deputy chief
completed a performance evaluation for each plaintiff; and they both received
a below average evaluation of their "professional qualities". 52 In the
performance evaluation, the deputy chief included a statement supporting his
conclusions that contained references to the non-payment of dues by the
plaintiffs, and that they "fail[ed] to realize the importance of the Association to
the officers and the Department."' Plaintiffs filed suit in district court
asserting a First Amendment freedom "not to associate" claim.'54
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed an "important distinction" between
the nature of speech and association claims in deciding whether to insist on a
public concern demonstration:
A Pickering/Connick balancing test, so useful in resolving public employee free
speech cases, is not easily transferable to freedom of association cases. That's because
some associational choices . . . are purely private matters. As such, one would think
they would usually come up short in a private versus public concern balancing test. So
strict reliance on Pickering/Connick presents potential problems . . . . [B]ecause
Connick's public concern test grew out of a speech case, it may not appropriately
recognize the important distinction between speech and association. This may lead, it
can be persuasively argued, to insufficient protection of the associational rights of
public employees.'"
Nevertheless, the Court did not want to overturn Seventh Circuit use of the
Pickering/Connick public concern test in associational claims but rather
decided to "wait for a better case than this one to consider a different
course."' As a result, the Court found the plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with the
Association "had nothing to do with [the Association's] political, social, or
religious goals - in short, with stands it took on matters of public concern" and
ruled the plaintiffs were not entitled to First Amendment protection because
their claims were nothing more than individual gripes.'
Judge Cudahy authored a separate opinion, in which he argued the Seventh
Circuit cases cited by the majority were not applicable to the Balton case
because those cases "involved both speech and association."' Reconsidering
151 See id
152 Balton, 133 F.3d at 1038-39.
153 Id. at 1039.
'5 4 Id.
1ss Balton v. City of Milwaukee, 133 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (citing Paul Cerkvenik, Who
Your Friends Are Could Get You Fired! The Connick "Public Concern" Test Unjustifiably
Restricts Public Employees' Associational Rights, 79 MiNN. L. REv. 425, 446 (1994)). The
district court applied a Pickering/Connick public concern analysis; plaintiffs appealed
application of such analysis to their freedom of association claim to the Seventh Circuit. See
id. at 1039.
156 Balton, 133 F.3d at 1040.
'57 See id.
1ss Id. at 1041 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Judge Cudahy explained:
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Marshall v. Allen, a Seventh Circuit case where an attorney sued when he was
terminated for breach of a directive not to speak about "employment-related
cases with colleagues who had filed discrimination cases against their
employer", Judge Cudahy distinguished Marshall as appropriate for the public
concern analysis because a court can easily assess the impact of the attorney's
disregard for the directive on the "work relationship" and apply the
Pickering/Connick test.'" Contrastingly, "in the typical pure association case,
the fact of association or of non-association has no impact on the work
relationship and no balancing is necessary" as the "pure associational
activities" are outside the workplace.'
Likewise, Judge Cudahy contended, "the Pickering/Connick test is
cumbersome in the context of a pure association claim"'' because the content,
form, and context analysis"' is difficult to apply where the substance of one's
association cannot be clearly ascertained.' 3 For these reasons, the
Pickering/Connick public concern test, then, "do[es] not supply a relevant test
for purely associational claims because such cases generally do not involve
interference with the work relationship.""6
B. The Pure Speech/Pure Associational Continuum
The underlying difference between cases like Pickering, Connick, and
Garcetti, and Piscottano, Flanagan, and Balton, is the speech/association
In Gregorich v. Lund, for example, the plaintiff alleged that he had been fired for
engaging in union-organizing activity. That kind of activity involves speech and
advocacy for the purpose of promoting membership in an association. But the mere act
of joining or not joining a union-or a union-like organization like the Chiefs
Association-involves the exercise of purely associational rights.
Id. at 1041 (citing Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 411-412 (7th Cir. 1995).
19 Id. at 1041 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (citing Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 790, 794
(7th Cir. 1993)).
160 Id. at 1041 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
161 Id.
162 See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text (discussing content, form, and context
analysis in Connick).
163 Balton, 133 F.3d at 1041 (Cudahy, J., concurring) ("But how does one neatly apply
the content, form, and context analysis to a claim that [the deputy chief] retaliated against
[the plaintiffs] because they refused to pay dues or wished to disassociate from the Chiefs
Association?").
Judge Cudahy discussed Griffin v. Thomas, where an assistant principal claimed
retaliation by her employer on the basis that she filed a grievance with the union. See id
(citing Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1210 (7th Cir. 1991)). He posited the
Pickering/Connick analysis was easy to apply in Griffin because "the court was able to
review the substance of her grievance." Id.
164 Balton, 133 F.3d at 1041.
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distinction. In Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti, the plaintiffs received
unfavorable employment decisions simply because of their overt speech in the
course of their employment. Mr. Pickering sent his letter to the local
newspaper; Ms. Myers distributed a questionnaire amongst her co-workers in
the officer; Mr. Ceballos wrote a memorandum to his superiors voicing his
concerns and testified to such.' 5 All of these cases exemplify overt speech
acts, which justify the application of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis
to those cases.'"
The Piscottano, Flanagan, and Balton cases, on the other hand, represent
examples where public employees received unfavorable employment decisions
simply because of membership in associations outside of their employment.
The Piscottano plaintiffs were retaliated against for their membership in the
Outlaws; the Flanagan plaintiffs were terminated for opening a video rental
store outside their employment as police officers; and the Balton plaintiffs
received unfavorable employment decisions for refusing to pay dues to an
unofficial organization related to their positions because of their dissatisfaction
with the performance of the Association.' 7 Such cases are outside the purview
of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti speech analysis plainly because they lack
165 See supra notes 30, 41, 51 and accompanying text (discussing means of speech of
each of the plaintiffs).
166 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment and
public employee speech); see also Craig D. Singer, Conduct and Belief Public Employees'
First Amendment Rights to Free Expression and Political Affiliation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
897, 905 n.57 (1992) (explaining how in Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1336 (4th Cir.
1984) "[The Court] held that if the motivation of the employer in firing the employee was
purely one of political affiliation, then the Elrod-Branti test is the appropriate one, but if the
employer was motivated 'to any significant degree by overt speech activity by the public
employee,' then the Pickering test applies instead."). See also supra text accompanying
notes 100-107 (discussing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
167 See supra notes 116-119, 129-136, 146-154 and accompanying text (outlining facts of
Piscottano; facts of Flanagan; and facts of Balton). One might argue the plaintiffs in Balton
were members of an association pertaining to their employment since the Association
represented the interests of assistant chief dispatchers in collective bargaining, albeit
unofficially. See supra text accompanying notes 146-154 (discussing facts of Balton). While
this argument is somewhat tenuous since the membership in the Association was not
mandatory and did not qualify as a union (since the Association did not have any official
right in collective bargaining negotiations), the Balton case still would not qualify as a
hybrid case for purposes of analysis because the Balton plaintiffs did not make any overt
speech or action as members of the Association. See infra Part IV.C; supra notes 158-164
and accompanying text (discussing J. Cudahy's distinction between hybrid and purely
associational cases). Simply refusing to pay dues, and nothing more, because of their
dissatisfaction with the Association is hardly overt; in addition, refusal to pay dues is wholly
independent of their duties as assistant chief dispatchers. To qualify the refusal to pay dues
as either overt speech or related to their employment would mean public employers could
retaliate against public employees for failure to pay offerings at church, or gym membership
fees, for example, and demonstrates the danger of such a slippery slope.
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any overt speech or act on behalf of their association, and, except the Balton
plaintiffs, membership in their respective associations were wholly
independent of their employment responsibilities.68
C. The Hybrid Cases
In the middle, as Judge Cudahy pointed out in Balton, are the hybrid
speech/association cases.'" In Hudson v. Craven, for example, the Ninth
Circuit found a teacher's claim of retaliation for participating in an anti-WTO
protest with her students as part of a "de facto class field trip" to be a hybrid
speech/association case.'70 Similarly, in Melzer v. Board of Education, the
Second Circuit found a teacher's membership in the North American Man/Boy
Love Association ("NAMBLA") to be a hybrid speech/association case as "the
activity which prompted the Board to fire Melzer was not a specific instance of
speech, or a particular disruptive statement, but an associational activity of
which speech was an essential component.""'
In Hudson, the associational expression drifted into the realm of public
employee speech when Hudson protested at a rally with her students, and in
Melzer, NAMBLA membership became essential public employee speech
when Melzer discussed strategies with a fellow teacher on how to avoid
discovery of their NAMBLA membership.'72 In contrast, Piscottano,
Flanagan, and Balton clearly lack an essential speech component to their
associational claims. The Piscottano plaintiffs did not advocate any speech as a
168 See supra notes 116-119, 129-136, 146-154 and accompanying text. The plaintiffs in
Piscottano and Flanagan, in a sense, participated in these organizations "as citizens." Cf
supra notes and accompanying text 55-63 (discussing "as a citizen" analysis in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)). The citizen versus public employee distinction from the
public employee speech cases is instructive to determine whether a public employee's
participation in an organization or association is wholly independent from their job as a
public employee.
169 See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text (discussing hybrid and purely
associational distinction); see also Herrera v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 601, 609-10
(E.D. La. 2002) ("The Fifth Circuit recognizes that some speech contains both public and
private elements. In cases of 'mixed speech,' the Fifth Circuit has ruled that courts 'are
bound to consider the Connick factors of content, context and form, and determine whether
the speech is public or private based on these factors."') (quoting Teague v. City of Flower
Mound, 179 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1999)).
170 See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 693-96 (9th Cir. 2005).
871 Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2003); see An Introduction to
NAMBLA: Who We Are, NAMBLA, http://www.nambla.org/welcome.htm (last visited Jan.
1, 2011). Melzer was a writer and editor of the NAMBLA publication, The Bulletin, and
was videotaped guiding a fellow member and teacher on how to avoid discovery of the
teacher's NAMBLA affiliation. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189, 191.
172 Melzer. 336 F.3d at 191.
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public employee as part of their membership in the Outlaws; the Flanagan
plaintiffs did not intersect their video rental store occupation with their jobs as
police officers'; and the Balton plaintiffs did not speak out against the
Association but merely stopped adhering to their obligation to pay dues. 74
D. The Bright Line Test Emerges
From the above examples, a bright line analysis between the hybrid
speech/association ("hybrid") and the purely associational ("pure") cases
emerges. Courts should apply the following analysis to determine whether a
First Amendment public employee case is hybrid or pure: (1) plaintiff asserts a
First Amendment associational claim; (2) plaintiffs claim involves an essential
speech component; and (3) there is a nexus between the essential speech
component and the plaintiff s public employment. If none of the three elements
are demonstrated, the facts present a pure case, and a strict scrutiny analysis,
discussed infra, should apply.' If all three elements are met, the case qualifies
as hybrid, and the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti public concern analysis should
apply.
E. Application of Strict Scrutiny Analysis to Pure Cases
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court has applied a strict scrutiny analysis
to public employee freedom of association political affiliation and expression
cases.' Such an analysis is most appropriate for pure cases because it best
preserves the First Amendment rights of the employee without encroaching
unnecessarily on the government's need to promote efficiency, productivity,
and harmony in the workplace."
1. Advantage ofStrict Scrutiny Analysis in Pure Cases
First, the strict scrutiny analysis provides the maximum protection of the
First Amendment rights of public employees because it provides a minimum
chilling effect on employees' association." Since the pure cases do not
'" Cf City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (holding a police
officer's pornography website where the plaintiff performed sexual acts in a police uniform
and sold police equipment was not protected under Pickering/Connick).
'74 See supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Balton).
"7 See infra Part I.E.
176 See supra Part 1I.B.
'n See supra Part I1.4.b.
"I See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the need to prevent a chilling
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involve any overt speech by the public employee, the courts' deference to the
government's interest in maintaining efficiency, productivity, and workplace
harmony is unnecessary and misplaced. When the government's interest as an
employer is no longer the focus, the courts should treat its actions as performed
in the role of the sovereign, not the employer, and shift the burden from the
employee to prove a public concern to the government to prove a compelling
state interest in suppression of the public employee's association.'
Second, the strict scrutiny analysis creates predictable outcomes, as it
prevents any discretion by the employees' supervisors and the courts. The
determination of what is a matter of public concern and what is not is difficult
and messy. It requires a very fact-intensive analysis that risks inconsistent
application and indiscretion.'so In pure cases, such discretion is inappropriate
because the government's role as an employer is not a factor; thus, the
compulsion to craft the analysis towards the outcome of giving the government
leeway becomes misplaced.
Not all is lost for the government, though. The public employer still has
some room to craft regulations and hand down employment decisions that
affect a public employee's associational freedom so long as those actions are
the least restrictive means.'"' Since the pure cases represent situations where
the public employer has the least jurisdiction to regulate the First Amendment
freedoms of its employees, any regulations in those situations must be strictly
scrutinized to ensure maximum protection for the public employee. For
example, in Piscottano, the Department of Corrections would be able to
prescribe regulations to prevent employees similarly situated to the plaintiffs
from engaging in certain illegal activity as members of the Outlaws, so long as
the purpose of the regulations (preventing illegal activity by correctional
officers) could not be attained by less restrictive means.'82
2. Disadvantages ofPickering/Connick/Garcetti Test
The complexity of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test makes it ill-suited for
effect).
19 See supra Part lI.B; cf Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the
government as sovereign.").
180 See supra Part II.A.4.a.
181 See supra note 107 (discussing least restrictive means requirement of strict scrutiny
analysis); cf People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 76-78
(1928) (affirming consideration of state legislature of the Ku Klux Klan's dangerous and
violent activities.).
182 See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text (outlining the facts of Piscottano).
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pure associational cases. Speech has wholly different implications because it is
explicit expression, increasing the likelihood of imputation of the content and
means of the expression to the government. Speech requires such special
attention because the public could conclude the government adopts or supports
the content or view contained in the employee's speech, as well as supports the
manner in which the employee spoke, resembling guilt by association.'" For
example, Mr. Ceballos' defense testimony that an affidavit for an arrest
warrant was defective created an appearance of impropriety that potentially
had very serious effects on the public's impression of the office of the district
attorney and government generally. 84 This risk of negative association with
Mr. Ceballos' speech and, thus, speech of public employees generally, requires
courts to give more deference to the public employer to properly protect state
interests as the employer.
Association, however, as an implicit form of the expression of ideas,
decreases the risk of associating the employee's content and means of
expression through membership in an organization. The risk decreases in pure
cases because the message and membership is ambiguous in meaning. Balton
illustrates the potential ambiguities that an employee's membership in an
association might have. To an outsider, the Balton plaintiffs' choice to join the
Association might appear to be personally, economically, or socially
motivated. Still, the risk of negative association with the Balton plaintiff's
membership in the Association, or choice to leave the Association, is in no way
significant enough to justify application of the public concern analysis. Even if
Balton appears on it's face to be the constitutionalizing of the grievance
process the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis seeks to avoid, the heightened
deference to the State's interests is unnecessary. The risk of negative effect on
the State's public reputation may not be low, but the burden on the employee's
First Amendment rights is comparatively much higher.
Additionally, the sequence of analysis in a public employee speech case
compared to a freedom of association case demonstrates the preference of a
strict scrutiny analysis for pure associational cases. The difference between
speech and purely associational cases turns on the burden shifts. In a speech
case, the elements are: (1) expression by public employee; and (2) adverse
employment decision by public employer as a result of the expression.' At
this point in other First Amendment cases, the government is supposed to bear
183 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (emphasizing the need for a bright line
rule between official and unofficial duties).
184 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (examining the pretenses of
investigation present in Garcetti).
85 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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the burden of proof that the government action fell outside First Amendment
protection.'" Under the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis, however, the
burden stays on the plaintiff to demonstrate the "public concern" and "as a
citizen" elements; it is not until these elements are satisfied that the burden
finally shifts to the government to show the Pickering balance - that the
government interests outweighed the employee's First Amendment
protections.'" With the strict scrutiny analysis, once the public employee
demonstrates the association as the cause of the adverse employment decision,
the burden properly shifts to the government to prove the compelling state
interest and least restrictive means prongs.'" As the negative impact risk is
low, discussed supra, such a high burden of proof on the plaintiff is
inappropriate in purely associational cases.'"
Forcing the public employee to shoulder the burden of proof in purely
associational cases makes the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis
underinclusive. Plaintiffs like Mr. LaPosta wishing to join a different union
than the popular crowd are excluded from protection, but if Mr. LaPosta and
the members of the popular union joined together because the Police
Department retaliated on the basis of their general membership in a union, their
expression would be protected. In a sense, Mr. LaPosta bears the burden of
showing why the PBA is more of a public concern than the FOP, otherwise his
claim is just a grievance, outside the protection of the First Amendment. Such
an outcome is unsettling.
Moreover, application of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis to purely
associational cases distorts the public-private divide. To hold public employees
generally to the high standard of carrying the burden of acting as a public
employee when they leave the office is not only unduly burdensome, but also
discourages citizens to join the government workforce.
Lastly, the heightened burden on the plaintiff coupled with the fact-intensive
analysis of the public concern prong and Pickering balancing severely
undercuts the First Amendment protection of public employees. The content,
context, and form of the expression examined by the public concern analysis
and the manner, time, and place of the expression examined by the Pickering
balance are so dependent upon each other, courts essentially perform the same
analysis twice.'" Meaning, even if a plaintiff can demonstrate the content and
186 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
187 See discussion supra Part II.A.4.
188 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
189 This is not to say that the increased burden in speech cases through the
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti s proper. Such an argument, however, is beyond the scope of
this comment.
190 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157-58 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
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context of their association touches upon a matter of public concern, which is
supposed to be afforded heightened protection, the government can defeat the
plaintiffs claim by merely showing the government has an interest in
suppressing the content and context of the employee's association and nothing
more. Implicitly, then, the heightened protection afforded to the plaintiff
through the public concern demonstration is effectively lost in the
discretionary Pickering analysis. It is for this same reason that the Pickering-
only analysis inadequately protects public employees in purely associational
cases. Courts can implicitly apply the public concern test. Moreover, the focus
on the efficiency of the workplace, coupled with the hostility towards intrusion
or second-guessing of employer decisions eliminates any real difference
between the two tests. 191
V. CONCLUSION
Application of any element of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti analysis,
derived from public employee speech cases, is inappropriate in purely
associational First Amendment public employee cases. The body of public
employee freedom of association case law is in such disarray because of
courts' erroneous imposition of some form of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti
analysis to purely associational cases. The freedoms of speech and association
are too complicated for courts to resolve such cases with a one-size-fits-all
approach. Courts need to conduct a fact-intensive analysis and first determine
whether a case presents a purely speech, purely associational, or hybrid
speech/association claim. Furthermore, in purely associational cases, a strict
scrutiny analysis derived from the Elrod/Letter Carriers line of cases should
apply to properly protect the First Amendment associational freedoms of
public employees.
Court distorts the balancing analysis required under Pickering by suggesting that one factor,
the context in which a statement is made, is to be weighed twice - first in determining
whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern and then in deciding
whether the statement adversely affected the government's interest as an employer.")
(emphasis in original).
'9' It is for this same reason that the Pickering-only analysis inadequately protects public
employees in purely associational cases. Courts can implicitly apply the public concern test.
Moreover, the focus on the efficiency of the workplace, coupled with the hostility towards
intrusion or second-guessing of employer decisions eliminates any real difference between
the two tests. See Paetzold, supra note 9, at 100 ("[C]oncern for the public employer's right
to maintain efficiency was coupled with a judicial hostility toward allowing federal courts to
intrusively interfere or second guess the public employer's judgments regarding how best to
achieve that efficiency in public functioning."); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422
(2006); cf Paetzold, supra, at 100 (noting that federal courts hold the same animosity
towards questioning private employer decisions as public employers).
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